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Abstract—This research uses machine learning and outlier
analysis to detect potentially hostile insiders through the auto-
mated analysis of stored data on cell phones, laptops, and desktop
computers belonging to members of an organization. Whereas
other systems look for specific signatures associated with hostile
insider activity, our system is based on the creation of a “storage
profile” for each user and then an automated analysis of all the
storage profiles in the organization, with the purpose of finding
storage outliers. Our hypothesis is that malicious insiders will
have specific data and concentrations of data that differ from
their colleagues and coworkers. By exploiting these differences,
we can identify potentially hostile insiders.
Our system is based on a combination of existing open source
computer forensic tools and datamining algorithms. We modify
these tools to perform a “lightweight” analysis based on statistical
sampling over time. In this, our approach is both efficient and
privacy sensitive. As a result, we can detect not just individuals
that differ from their co-workers, but also insiders that differ
from their historic norms. Accordingly, we should be able to
detect insiders that have been “turned” by events or outside
organizations. We should also be able to detect insider accounts
that have been taken over by outsiders.
Our project, now in its first year, is a three-year project
funded by the Department of Homeland Security, Science and
Technology Directorate, Cyber Security Division. In this paper
we describe the underlying approach and demonstrate how the
storage profile is created and collected using specially modified
open source tools. We also present the results of running these
tools on a 500GB corpus of simulated insider threat data created
by the Naval Postgraduate School in 2008 under grant from the
National Science Foundation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hostile insiders represent a serious and ongoing threat
for organizations worldwide. Trusted insiders such as Aldrich
Ames and Robert Hanssen have done much damage to the
US because of their decision to share classified information to
which they had access with enemies of the United States. More
recently, Bradley E. Manning has stood trial for collecting large
amounts of classified information on his SIPRNet computer
system, copying it to removable media, and then providing
that data to the WikiLeaks organization. In all of these cases,
the lack of sufficient internal monitoring and controls failed to
stop the internal collection and external dissemination (often
referred to as exfiltration) of highly sensitive documents.
Insiders engaged in illegal activities represent another kind
of hostile insiders that organizations need to address. In July
2010, for example, the Inspector General of the Department
of Defense released a 94 page report detailing how a group
of more than 50 federal employees and contractors with high-
level security clearances were involved in the collection and
distribution of child pornography—some of it on government
owned computer systems. [1]. Involvement with any kind
of pornography on government systems makes the offenders
subject to the threat of blackmail, which endangers national
security. Other federal agencies have had problems with insid-
ers collecting and then exfiltrating social security numbers and
even credit card numbers.
We believe that there is a single distinguishing character-
istic in many of these cases: as a preparation to exfiltrating
data, insiders will collect it on a single system, typically a
workstation under their control [2]. As such, the storage profile
of this workstation changes in significant ways. First, the
workstation suddenly has a collection of documents that makes
it significantly different from the other workstations in the
organization—it becomes an outlier. Second, the workstation
changes from its historical norms.
Prior attempts at insider detection have relied on measuring
information access patterns or the detection of signatures based
on historical incidents. These systems have been expensive to
develop and maintain, and have been subject to numerous false
positives and false negatives.
Based on our experience in media forensics, we are re-
searching a new approach for detecting hostile insiders. This
approach uses lightweight media forensics to create a storage
profile for each computer in an enterprise. These profiles are
reported to a central management console on a regular but
unpredictable basis. The management console then performs
routine lightweight datamining and outlier detection—that is,
it identifies which workstations are different from the norm, as
well as the reason that they are different.
II. ARCHITECTURE
Our novel architecture is based on a light weight media
forensics agent that covertly collects and securely reports an
inventory of the contents of each mass storage device (e.g.,
hard drive or SSD) in the enterprise, and a datamining solution
that performs unsupervised clustering and outlier analysis.
Outliers are reported at a management console to the security
administrators, who can then investigate further.
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A. Light Weight Media Forensics Agent
Media Forensics is a term of art used in the law enforce-
ment and intelligence communities to describe digital forensics
applied to computer media such as hard drives, portable
storage devices and optical storage. As practiced today, media
forensics is a slow, labor-intensive process. Analyzing a single
200GB hard drive might take a seasoned analyst 10-20 hours.
We are using other approaches to media forensics to
develop a system that can largely function without human
involvement. Our system combines three elements: bulk data
analysis, random sampling, and automated file system meta-
data extraction.
1) Bulk Data Analysis. This approach ignores the structure
of files on the hard drive and instead analyzes the bulk
data on the drive from the first sector to the last. We
have developed a program called bulk extractor [3] that
can scan a hard drive for email addresses, credit card
numbers, social security numbers, keywords, and other
kinds of sensitive information. The program can also
perform fragment type identification using specialized
algorithms [4] and by recognizing known content through
identification of block hashes [5]. The results are tabulated
into a histogram (Figure 1 shows an example of the email
histogram).
2) Random Sampling. This approach also ignores files, but
instead of examining each sector on the hard drive, it
randomly samples between 1% and 2% of the drive.
Using this approach we can rapidly calculate the drive’s
forensic inventory—for example, the amount of the drive
dedicated to storing PDFs, Microsoft Word files, still
images, videos, and encrypted content.
3) Automated File System Metadata Extraction. This
approach walks the file system of a hard drive and extracts
metadata for each file into a single XML block using
Digital Forensics XML [6]. The metadata includes file
names, file modification times, and document properties
such as file creator, file print time, and other information.
Using these approaches, we are building a local surveil-
lance agent that will covertly monitor the forensic contents
of each enterprise workstation on a regular-but-unpredictable
basis (every 1-3 days, for example), which the user will not be
able to detect or disable. Built upon Google’s Rapid Response
(GRR) Framework [7], the agent will create a management
report for each workstation consisting of:
• An estimation of the total # of email addresses on the
hard drive, and the most popular 100.
• An estimation of the total # of credit card numbers on
the hard drive.
• An estimation of the total # of social security numbers
on the hard drive.
• An estimation of the percentage of the drive devoted to
JPEGs, video, and encrypted data.
• The number of allocated files on the drive, their file
extensions, and their type as determined by file extension,
internal magic numbers (using [8]), and the file type deter-
mined using our support vector machine-based classifier.
• Document metadata information.


























Fig. 1. A portion of the email address histogram found on the drive pat-
2009-12-02, part of the NPS M57-Patents corpus. The email addresses in the
m57.biz and nitroba.com domains are fictional; the others are part of software
distributions and are already in the public domain. The notation (utf16=NN)
means that NN of the email addresses found on the media were in UTF-16;
the remainder were in UTF-8 or ASCII.
management console using either an existing management
framework or a lightweight transport system based on web
services.
B. Histogram Processing
In previous work PI Garfinkel has shown that frequency
distribution histograms are of significant use in forensic in-
vestigations [9]. For example, a frequency histogram of email
addresses found on a hard drive readily identifies the drive’s
primary user and that person’s primary contacts.
Histogram generation is integrated with the feature record-
ing system so that histograms can be created for any feature.
Our design further allows histograms to be generated from
substrings extracted from features using regular expressions.
For example, bulk extractor creates a histogram of search
terms provided to Google, Yahoo, and other popular search
engines. Histograms of search terms are particularly useful
when conducting an investigation, as they reveal the intent
of the computer’s user.1
Histogram analysis is a powerful tool that supports our goal
in using bulk extractor as a tool for detecting hostile insiders.
Histogram analysis gives both our outlier analysis tool and
the human analyst contextual information that can be used in
rating information that is discovered through lightweight media
forensics.
1For example, at the 2008 murder trial of Neil Entwistle, prosecutors
introduced evidence that Entwistle had performed Internet searches for murder
techniques just three days before his wife and child were found murdered [10].
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C. Outlier Analysis
Although every hard drive is different, our previous expe-
riences have shown that hard drives with unusual statistical
properties invariably warrant further analysis. Figure 2 shows
data from a previous study regarding the inadvertent release
of confidential information through the sale of used computer
equipment that had not been properly sanitized. To conduct
this study approximately 250 used hard drives were purchased
on the secondary market (e.g., used computer stores, computer
swap meets and pawn shops) and then scanned for credit card
numbers. The graph shows the number of total CCNs on each
drive (blue) and the number that were distinct (red). As can
be seen, while most hard drives in the collection contained no
credit card numbers or just a few, 4 drives contained hundreds
and 3 drives contained thousands. By using outlier analysis
it was possible to rapidly find those drives that needed to be
manually investigated. Details can be found in [11].
We hypothesize that a similar approach can be used to
find some kinds of hostile insiders—specifically insiders that
are collecting information on specific computers either for
personal use that is inconsistent with organizational norms (as
is the case with pornography), or collecting information with
the intent of later exfiltration (as is the case with those stealing
sensitive information).
We are exploring the use of cluster analysis to identify
statistical outliers. Being a statistical outlier in this context
indicates the outlier media (e.g., a specific employee’s worksta-
tion) has a storage profile unlike others in the organization, or
unlike itself from an historical perspective. Cluster analysis is
a widely accepted technique that is commonly and successfully
used in fraud detection and network intrusion detection. It
presents three important benefits:
1) Discovery, not signature-based. Clustering algorithms
are unsupervised. That is, they do not require a priori
knowledge of known signatures, which is extremely im-
portant in the insider threat detection context. This is
because we know from analysis of past cases that there are
significant differences across classes of insiders, as well
as variation at the individual level within classes [12] [2].
2) Scalability. While we are proposing a lightweight solu-
tion in terms of extractor and transport agents, data for
analysis could be significant in large, busy organizations.
Highly scalable clustering algorithms have been devel-
oped that scale linearly O(n), or even logarithmically
O(log(n)) in some cases, and that handle noisy data sets
well.
3) Meaningful results. Some machine learning techniques,
while effective (for prediction, for example) are difficult
to interpret and explain. It is often important to understand
and be able to explain why the algorithms partitioned data
in a certain way, or predicted a certain outcome. This is
critically important when launching further inquiries as a
result of anomaly detection findings.
Our outlier analysis and identification system should create
organizational and sub-organizational, level storage profiles
based on actual use. We expect that the system will accom-
modate real-world changes in organizational baselines over
time. The system should also be able to detect statistical
outliers pertaining to one workstation relative to the rest of
the workstations in an organization.
The system should be capable of simultaneously consid-
ering individual, sub-organization, role-based, and organiza-
tional levels of analysis. For example, perhaps one employee’s
storage profile is not a statistical outlier considering the orga-
nizational dimension alone, but is a statistical outlier when
considering the job function and organization level profile
simultaneously. In short, several analytical variations will be
permissible to facilitate more granular outlier detection.
Last, we plan to expand the system so that it can detect sta-
tistically anomalous changes in individual storage profiles over
time. So, perhaps the insider’s storage activity is inconspicuous
enough to thwart statistical detection at the organizational
level. The individual, time-based detection mechanisms can be
more sensitive since the variance is lower. Hence, more subtle
changes in storage activity can be detected via lightweight
media forensics considering changes to the workstation alone
over time.
All of this should be possible because outliers statistically
deviate from other observations. Observations that are not out-
liers conform to an underlying statistical distribution. Several
challenges exist in designing a threat detection system via
cluster-based outlier detection, including algorithm detection
and feature selection.
D. Algorithm Selection
Proper algorithm selection and adaptation is critical to
successful outlier detection. Clustering algorithms partition
observations, but the manner in which the ‘space’ is partitioned
varies between algorithms. This impacts cluster quality and
algorithm efficiency. Data clustering methods, independent of
whether the data being clustered is textual (i.e. unstructured)
or structured, can be grouped into five categories: partitioning,
hierarchical, density-based, grid-based, and model-based [13].
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages.
a) Partitioning methods: for example, k-means and k-
medoids clustering, group data into mutually exclusive clusters
that minimize the intra-cluster variation, while maximizing
inter-cluster variation. Partitional clustering is an iterative
process, re-computing cluster and item similarity measures
and reassigning items until convergence occurs (ideally, or
until a maximum number of iterations is reached). Partitioning
methods are a commonly used clustering method, due to their
speed, simplicity, and scalability [13]–[15]. This is due to low
computational expense (time complexity, running time) and
space (i.e. memory) requirements.
The disadvantages of partitioning methods, however, in-
clude:
• tendency toward spherical clusters, thus impacting cluster
quality (i.e. validity and meaningfulness) [16], [17];
• tendency toward balanced clusters, which can also impact
cluster quality [16];
• difficulty dealing with noisy data and outliers [13];
• dependence on initial cluster selection, which reduces
cluster stability and reliability [13], [17];
• its overall tendency to result in local minimums instead of






























Fig. 2. This graph shows the number of unique credit card numbers and the total number of credit card numbers found on 250 different hard drives acquired
on the secondary market. As can be seen most hard drives have relatively small number of credit card numbers. Some drives, however, have large numbers
of credit card numbers. For the research project that produced this graph, outliers were examined to understand the process failures within each organization
that resulted in the data being inadvertantly released. This same approach could be used to identify outlier drives inside an enterprise network that might be
indicative of a hostile insider.
locally, but overall cluster variation is not minimized/op-
timized) [17].
b) Hierarchical clustering: is often preferred over par-
titional clustering, due to its ability to achieve improved
cluster quality [17]. Hierarchical clustering uses a dendogram-
based approach and either forms clusters (i.e. bottom-up,
agglomerative approach) or divides clusters (i.e. top-down,
divisive approach) by calculating pair wise item similarity.
The computational expense and space requirements associated
with such calculation, however, greatly limit its scalability.
The computational expense of discriminative methods (those
utilizing pair wise similarity measurements) is a quadratic
function of the number of inputs being clustered: O(n2), where
O is the data set containing items {o1,o2,o3 . . .o(n)} [13],
[14]. In contrast, the computational expense of partitional
approaches is a linear function of the number of inputs: O(n)
[13], [14].
c) Density-based clustering approaches: use density
functions as local cluster criterion. They are advantageous
over partitional clustering, in the sense that they handle noise
better, can discover arbitrarily shaped clusters, and produce
higher quality clusters [18]. Their primary disadvantage is
computational expense and space requirements. Like hierarchi-
cal clustering, their computational cost is a quadratic function
of the number of inputs, limiting their scalability to large data
sets [13], [18].
d) Grid-based clustering: approaches quantize the data
space into a finite number of grids, which subsequently form
clusters. Such approaches are advantageous because they are
insensitive to data input order and are computationally effi-
cient, with run time scaling linearly with data set size, i.e.,
O(n) [13]. The primary disadvantage of grid-based cluster-
ing approaches, however, is cluster quality/accuracy. Cluster
quality is hindered by: (1) the simplicity of clustering com-
putations; (2) the necessarily straight cluster boundaries that
do not usually coincide with the inherent structure of the data;
(3) relatively arbitrary assignment of data to clusters at or near
grid vertices; and (4) difficulty in selecting the optimum grid
resolution.
e) Model-based clustering: is the fifth category of
clustering approaches. Model-based clustering is generative in
nature. That is to say, the approaches assume parametric and
probabilistic patterns exist in the data and clusters are modeled
accordingly. Model-based clustering utilizes machine learn-
ing (e.g. neural networks) and/or statistical approaches (e.g.
conceptual clustering and Bayesian clustering) [13]. Because
of the probabilistic, parametric assumptions underlying the
clustering process and mathematics, model-based approaches
are advantageous for the following reasons:
• they are usually insensitive to input order;
89
• they are mathematically capable of detecting and handling
outliers and generally noisy data;
• they can model non-spherical and/or unbalanced clusters,
and
• they are designed to achieve global optimization (i.e.
they minimize intra-cluster variance and maximize inter-
cluster variance from a global perspective).
The computational expense of model-based clustering ap-
proaches varies between approaches, but is often higher order
[19]. A notable exception to this is Kohonen’s Self-Organizing
Map (SOM) approach-an unsupervised neural network ap-
proach [20]. Implementations of SOM for clustering scale
linearly O(n) with data set size and sometimes even scale
logarithmically O(log(n)) [21]. They also handle noisy data
well [20].
We are now experimenting with the a self-organizing neural
network algorithm to partition the observation space and detect
statistical storage anomalies, because the data will undoubtably
be very noisy, and the inherent data structure and clusters
will most likely be non-spherical, unbalanced, and highly
skewed. A self-organized neural network algorithm, such as
a Kohonen SOM or adaptation thereof, have the advantage
of producing results that can be readily interpreted. SOMs use
vector quantization and non-linear mapping to transform mutli-
dimensional input into two-dimensional, navigatable output,
that is easy to understand by the user. The user is able to under-
stand why observations clustered together in low-dimensional
space, whereas traditional neural networks act as black boxes,
wherein the underlying structure of the cluster remains unclear.
Since this application will alert analysts to possible threats via
statistical anomaly detection, it is imperative that the analysts
can interpret clusters of interest.
The threat detection engine (outlier analysis system) that
we are building should dynamically map the organization’s
normal storage profiles. The map will be dynamic in the sense
that normal will change over time as the organization changes,
missions change, and as a result of daily changes in low-
level operations. The clustering algorithm facilitates a dynamic
mapping since it learns with each new input and each new
mapping iteration. It will not learn from anomalies, as they are
statistically identified as outliers due to their vector distance
(also known as quantization error) from its best matching
neuron (map node). The system will have the capability of
re-introducing the observation and adapting the map, should
the observation be deemed in fact normal. An important aspect
of the research will be adapting and tunding traditional SOM
algorithms to best fit the proposed context and empirically
determining the most appropriate anomaly detection threshold
for the analyst.
E. Feature Selection
Another critical design consideration in cluster-based out-
lier detection is feature selection. Features are the characteris-
tics of an observation. Improper feature selection significantly
compromises the effectiveness of the clustering algorithm.
Selecting non-essential features reduces the signal to noise
ratio and diminishes the ability of the clustering algorithm to
detect anomalies. Omitting essential features leaves important
classifiers out of the equation. Effective multi-dimensional
clustering for outlier detection necessitates the right features
be selected.
The research should empirically validate hypothesized fea-
tures itemized previously in section 2A. Our hypothesized
features fall into two categories: (1) media forensics features,
and (2) user features. Media forensics features include those
previously discussed, including total numbers of email ad-
dresses, credit card numbers, etc., allocated file type infor-
mation and distribution, drive allocation percentage, document
metadata, etc. User features may include organizational unit,
job function, security clearance, access permissions, and other
aspects specific to an organization.
We hypothesized the media forensics feature based on
known facts from documented insider threat cases. For ex-
ample, email remains one of the top 3 methods for exfiltrating
data [22] - used in 30% of documented insider cases reviewed
by the CERT Insider Threat Center [23]. Thus, we will look for
email-based anomalies concerning addresses found on the hard
drive. File type information (e.g. file extension) has proven
relevant in insider cases, whether indicative of the type of
data stored, or indicative of attempts to hide types of data
stored [24]. File type distribution can also provide indication
of inappropriate collections of graphic images and video files,
which may be an exploitation risk, or an indication of covert
channeling via steganography [24]. Abnormally large amounts
of encrypted data, or unaccounted for spikes in the amount of
encrypted data stored can also be an indicator of unauthorized
data collection and exfiltration [24]. Past insider threat cases
in the financial sector have demonstrated a common pattern of
collecting personally identifiable information (PII) (e.g. social
security numbers and credit card number), for the purpose of
transforming the data into formats preferred by consumers of
the data [25]. Last, past research has shown the value of user
features, such as user role, in detecting breaches by insiders
[26].
III. STATUS OF PROJECT
At the present time we are just at the beginning of
this project. Work to date has consisted largely of making
modifications to the bulk extractor to allow its use in a
distributed manner, and improvements to the file fragment type
identification work so that we can more reliably characterize
information sampled from the storage media.
As part of adopting bulk extractor to work with the
GRR Framework we have substantially cleaned the code,
largely eliminating the use of global variables and improving
the isolation between various program functions. The result
of this effort will be splitting of the previously monolithic
bulk extractor program into several functional modules: one
module samples the disk, one module runs the scanners,
and finally a separate “plug-in” module for each scanner.
Although we will continue to be able to run bulk extractor as
a monolithic program, we will also be able to use it as a library
that can be called from the Python programming language.
As part of our effort to develop reliable technology for file
fragment type identification we have attempted to replicate the
work of Gopal et al. [28], Zhulyn et al. [27], and Beebe et
al. [29]. The code Gopal et al. developed is algorithmically
equivalent to using bigrams as features and Liblinear [30] “S
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S2 S3 c
Features Train.Time Pred.Time accuracy Train.Time Pred.Time accuracy
unigrams 19m 9.518s 4.208s 55.99% 29m 46.439s 4.162s 48.20% 256
bigrams 5h 22m 21.391s 31.286s 68.12% 4h 34m 39.545s 32.649s 68.26% 1024
trigrams 174h 46m 5.795s 7m 47.676s 62.76% 211h 8m 47.311s 7m 23.068s 70.19% 1024
uni+bi 7h 39m 46.240s 36.019s 68.68% 3h 54m 36.043s 37.834s 67.06% 256
FS5 7h 51m 35.550s 35.111s 69.83% 7h 27m 34.618s 36.697s 68.92% 256
TABLE I. EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENT FEATURE SETS FOR FILE FRAGMENT TYPE IDENTIFICATION WITH LIBLINEAR S2 AND S3.
FS5 IS THE FEATURE SET OF CONCATENATED UNIGRAMS+BIGRAMS+ ENTROPY, KOLMOGROV COMPLEXITY, MEAN BYTE VALUE, HAMMING WEIGHT,
AVERAGE CONTIGUITY BETWEEN BYTES, AND LONGEST BYTE STREAK [27]
3” (L2 regularized L1 loss function, dual solver). Across 52
file and data types, the result using liblinear that approximates
the Gopal approach is 68.26% accuracy in our experimentation
(see Table 1). We found significantly improved accuracy using
trigrams instead of bigrams, but the training time was orders
of magnitude longer. We are also developing an improved
approach for training.
Overall, the results that we have seen to date are rather
similar across loss functions/solvers, as well as feature sets.
Nonetheless, we are currently concluding that the “FS5”
feature set (unigram+bigram+ entropy+Kolmogrov complex-
ity+mean byte value+Hamming weight+average contiguity be-
tween bytes+longest byte streak) and the L2 regularized L2
loss function, primal solver is the optimal approach. We believe
that we can further improve our accuracy through the use of
summarized pattern features and by eliminating untrainable
data.
Summarized pattern features were introduced by Collins
[31]. The basic idea is to reduce the diversity of particular
features by mapping individual characters to character classes.
For example, all lower case letters could be replaced with their
upper case equivalent, all digits could be replaced with the digit
“5”, and so on. Although summarized patterns were originally
developed for named entity recognition [32], Mayer applied
them to file fragment identification with great success [33].
Mayer also developed an approach for detecting and training
on a small vocabulary of relatively long n-grams in a corpus of
exemplars. For example, although the space of 9-grams is too
sparse to effectively train a SVM, adding the specific 9-gram
“endstream” to the mix will be highly useful when training a
SVM to detect PDF files.
We believe that training can be further improved by re-
moving from the training set so-called untrainable data such
as the zlib-compressed regions of PDF and Microsoft Open
Office XML files, as well as the Huffman-encoded regions of
JPEG files. We are currently developing a tool that will act as
a filter and automatically remove such data from our training
set.
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